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The Estimation of Prewar GNPVolatility, 1869-1938
ABSTRACT
New evidence is provided to assess the recent controversy regarding
the volatility of real economic activity before 1929 relative to the period
8ince World War II. Some recent work claims that the longstanding
ty1ized fact of greater prewar volatility is "spurious". In contrast, this
paper reconfirms the greater amplitude of business fluctuations prior to
the Great Depression.
The basic technique is the regression method, which estimates
equations for real GNP during 1909-38, with one or more explanatory
variables for components of GNP, and then uses the estimated coefficients
to "backcaat" real GNP for the period 1869-1908. The paper contains an
extensive examination of the sensitivity of these regression indexes to
alternative dependent variables, sample periods, detrending methods, and
the inclusion of alternative explanatory variables. Particular attention is
paid to the conflicting evidence regarding the amplitude of cycles in
construction activity between 1870 and 1890. The resulting prewar!
postwar volatility ratios, for 1869—1928 as compared to 1950-1980, range
from 1.43 to 2.16. The paper concludes by suggesting that this range of
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, one of the least controversial stylized facts in
macroeconomic history was the reduced volatility of output in the U. S.
after World War II. Indeed, Arthur Burns (1960) devoted his entire 1959
American Economic Association Presidential Address to explaining the
phenomenon of a more stable postwar economy. More recently, the
explanation of postwar output stability has been the subject of a debate
between John Taylor (1986), who argues that stability was achieved
despite the greater persistence of price movements that tends to make
output less stable, and Bradford DeLong and Lawrence Summers (1986),
who claim that, on the contrary, greater postwar price persistence has
contributed directly to output stability.
The relevance of both Burns' Address and the recent debate between
Taylor and DeLong—Summers, as well as the working assumptions of many
macroeconomists, have recently been called into question in a series of
papers by Christina Romer (1984) (1985) (1986). The three papers
compare standard data sources for, respectively, industrial production,
GNP, and the unemployment rate, with alternative series that she
constructs. In each case her new series display roughly the same
volatility before 1919 and after World War II.' This leads to the
1. The industrial production paper (1984) does not construct a new
prewar series but rather estimates a new "bad'1 series for the postwar
period basod on the techniques used to calculate the standard prewar
series. The real GNP paper (1985) uses regression techniques to construct
a new series for the period before 1919 but does not construct a new
"bad" series for the postwar period. The unemployment paper (1986) does
both, first developing a "bad" postwar series and then using that as theGNP Volatility, Page 2
conclusion that the stylized fact of improved postwar stability is
"spurious."
Contribution of This Paper
This paper is not a detailed critique or examination of Romer's
GNP paper (1985).2 Instead, it contains new research on the same
question that she addresses, the volatility of a regression index for
real GNP estimated for the period after 1908 and "backcasted" for the
period l869—l908. The aim of the exercise is to compare the
volatility of prewar GNP with that of postwar GNP, taking as a point of
departure the standard Gailman (1966) "components" series on GNP that
indicates that the pre—1909 economy was roughly twice as volatile as
the postwar economy.4
basisto construct a new prewar series based on the estimated
relationship between the two postwar series.
2. Romer's new unemployment series has already been subjected to
a detailed critique by David Weir (1985), who concludes after an
examination of detailed sectoral data that "even a very exaggerated
procyclical variant of Lebergott's estimates could not render the
economy of the early twentieth century as stable as that of its third
quarter."
3. The proximate
authorship of the data
to wonder whether the
appendix might exhibit
cause of our interest in this topic was our joint
appendix in Gordon (1986). Romer's work led us
pre—1909 Gailman GNP series used in that
excessive volatility.
4. Gailman (1966) does not present annual GNP series, but rather
five—year—overlapping decadal averages. The unpublished underlying
annual estimates were later published by Milton Friedman and Anna J.
Schwartz (1982).GNP Volatility, Page 3
In contrast to Romer, who follows the procedures of Kuznets very
closely in developing her new regression index of prewar real GNP, we
broaden the investigation by using a superior measure of real GNP in
the post—1908 regression estimation, by adding additional explanatory
variables, and by carrying out a wide—ranging set of sensitivity tests.
Our most important contribution is the use of new information on
activity in the economy outside of the commodity—producing sector.
Since the regression method is admittedly a second—best procedure
designed to estimate the elasticity of unobservable non—conunodity GNP
to observable connuodjty GNP, a natural direction by which the procedure
can be improved is to find data on non—commodity output that allows the
share of the GNP estimate based on observable data to be increased. By
introducing railroad freight ton—miles and construction activity as two
additional explanatory variables, we shed new light on the behavior of
the U. S. economy, particularly in the 1870s and 1880s.
Our work leads us to four important conclusions that go beyond
previous work in this field. First, there is not a shred of evidence
to support the view that the greater volatility of real GNP before 1929
is "spurious." We produce a range of pre—1929/postwar volatility
ratios, defined as the ratio of standard deviations of deviations from
trend in a prewar interval in a postwar interval. Of eight different
comparisons shown in our final Table 8, the range of prewar/postwar
volatility ratios extends from 1.73 to 2.17, with no estimate even
close to the 1.0 value needed to confirm the same degree of volatilityGNP Volatility, Page 4
prewar as postwar.5 By contrast, the standard Galiman components index
has a volatility ratio of 2.30, so that our results may be
characterized as finding that the Galiman index is at the upper end of
the range of volatility estimates implied by the regression technique.
Our prewar/postwar volatility ratios range from 75 to 95 percent of the
Galiman ratio, in contrast to the much lower ratio of 43 percent
(1.0/2.3) that would be required to conclude that the prewar economy
was no more volatile than the postwar economy.
Second, we reach different conclusions than Romer regarding
several issues that arise in developing regression indexes. For
instance, we find that inclusion of the Great Depression years in the
sample period of the estimated post—1908 regression equation lowers
rather than raises the estimated coefficients, the reverse of Roiner's
finding. Thus the application of her argument that the Great
Depression is atypical and that the sample period of the regression
should be limited to 1909—28 raises rather than lowers our volatility
ratios for the 1869—1908 interval compared with the postwar years.
Our third conclusion is that going beyond Kuznets and Romer to
include information on railroad traffic and construction activity not
only substantially improves the fit of the estimated post—1908
regression equations, but also implies a "backcast" pre—1909 regression
index with a substantially different amplitude and timing of business
cycles in the 1880s as compared with the standard Gallinan series. In
5. These ratios are based on the 1954—72 interval of the postwar
period, which we choose in Table 8 to exclude the influence of the
Korean war and the post—1972 oil shocks.GNP Volatility, Page 5
particular, the enormous boom of an implausible magnitude evident in
the Gailman series for the 1880—1884 period disappears in our
regression indexes, although the amplitude and timing of the recessions
of the 1870s and 1890s in the Gailman series is reconfirined here.
Fourth, the paper makes an independent contribution to the
estimation of construction output in the pre—1889 period. We exhibit
the inconsistent time series behavior of existing indexes of
construction materials output and of construction activity, and we note
that both types of indexes are based on extremely fragmentary data
prior to 1889. To deal with this problem we develop an optimal
weighting scheme for the available information, based on a regression
explaining construction output for the period after 1914.
Differences in Approach
Themain task of this paper is the creation of a new regression
index for real GNP for the period before 1909. We have discovered that
there are at least six basic issues that must be considered in developing a
pre-1909 real GNP series, of which Romer addresses only three.Here
we briefly summarize the six issues, of which the first three are those
addressed by Romer.
1. Components vs. regression. Is it better to build up a real GNP
estimate component-by—component or to estimate a regression?
2. Sample period. If the regression is estimated for data between
1909 and 1938 (the later year being the end of the homogenous
Shaw commodity output series>, should the Great Depression
years be excluded?GNP Volatility, Page 6
3. Measurement error. Here we follow Omer by adding an error
term to the "backcastedt' real GNP series to reflect the
variance in GNP not correlated with the commodity output
series.
4. Which Post—1908 GNP Series? For the period after 1909, the
Kuznets real GNP series used by Romer has been superseded by
the Commerce Department's own series that adheres to the
standard definitions. There is a strong case supporting the use
of this series for the post—1909 regression estimates, and it
makes a substantial difference.
5. Detrending Methods. To avoid prejudging whether long slumps
and booms occurred in the late nineteenth century, we compare
moving averages with the alternative technique of linear
detrending through selected benchmarks.
6. Supplementary Data. A common characteristic of the Kuznets—
Romer regression technique is its use of a single explanatory
variable, Shaw's series on commodity output. However, data
series exist for the 1869—1938 period on at least two major
elements of non—commodity real GNP, railroad freight ton—miles
and construction activity. Inclusion of either or both of these
additional indexes in the regressions for 1909—38 substantially
improves the fit and changes the properties of the "backcasted"
real GNP series for 1869—1908.
Plan of the Paper
We begin in Part II with a scorecard on the available indexes forGNP Volatility, Page 7
real GNP, commodity output, railroad ton—miles, and construction output,
identifying the various authors and time intervals. We exhibit tables
showing the time periods over which the indexes are available, and the
standard deviation of deviations from trend over alternative periods. Part
III discusses the three general issues (#4—#6 on the above list) that
confront the investigator attempting to develop a new regression index.
Then Part IV presents the regression results in a number of
permutations of dependent variables, detrending methods, and sets of
explanatory variables. Here we learn that some issues matter only with
particular permutations, and we examine plots and measures of volatility
for the most plausible alternative regression indexes. Substantial
attention is paid to the problems of measuring construction activity, and
to the development of a new regression index of construction output.
Finally, we review a set of factors that suggest that our regression
estimates may understate the volatility of pre-1909 real GNP, and exhibit
the sensitivity of the implied volatility ratios to these factors.
IL ALTERNATIVE INDEXES
OF REAL ACTIVITY
YouCan't Tell the Players without a Scorecard
Oneelement of complexity that may intimidate a novice in this
subject is the wide variety of alternative indexes that are discussed, and
the different time intervals to which they apply. Figure 1 describes the
indexes of real activity that play a role in this paper. Excluded are
other indexes of real GNP derived from those included here (e.g.,GNP Volatility, Page 8
Kendrick (1961)), the Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial
Production that is not available prior to 1919, monthly output indexes like
that of Persons (1931), and alternative indexes of construction activity.
The first section lists the real GNP indexes, beginning with the
"components" series. These share in common a disaggregated approach
that develops real GNP by sector, directly in the case of commodity
output and indirectly for sectors other than goods production. The
original components series is that of Kuznets (1961). Value added in
transportation, distribution, and construction is estimated by multiplying a
ratio times relevant categories of commodity output (e.g., construction
materials). While this ratio is allowed to move between decadal averages
to reflect changes in distributive margins and transportation charges, it is
not allowed any cyclical variability. In other words, the elasticity of
detrended transportation, distribution, and construction output to
deviations from trend of the relevant category of commodity output is
fixed at unity. In contrast, estimates of services output, inventory
change, and the change in foreign claims are based on regressions for
1919-41 of these components on commodity output, establishing a cyclical
elasticity can differ from unity and is used to estimate these components
before 1919.
Two other components indexes are listed in Table 1. Romer (1985)
has extended the Kuznets index for the 1919—28 interval, using similar
methods.6 And Galiman (1966) has made numerous revisions to the
6. There are two changes. First, actual data on construction
output are used rather than a markup over the output of construction
materials. Second, since income—side total GNP is available for 1919—28,GNP Volatility, Page 9
Kuznet,s estimates of sectoral components for the decadal Census years
between 1869 and 1909, altering the trend of the Kuznets index but not
its deviations from trend in intracensal years.
Income—side estimates of real GNP were constructed by Kuznets
(1941) for 1919—38 and were later extended back to 1909. Subsequently
the Department of Commerce adapted to its own concepts the Kuznets
series beginning in 1909. Among the most important changes is the
separation of government expenditures into a separate category rather
than their inclusion by Kuznets with consumption and investment
spending. The Commerce series, as we shall see, has very different
cyclical properties from the Kuznets income series over the 1909—28
interval.
Next listed are the two existing regression series, that developed by
Kuznets and that reconstructed recently by Romer. Both share in
common an estimated regression of the Kuznets post—1908 income—side
GNP estimate on Shaw's commodity output series, and, using the
estimated coefficients, both create a fitted value for the period 1869—1918
(with 1909—18 as an overlap period).The main differences are Romer's
use of statistical regression vs. Kuznets' "freehand regression curve," her
use of seven—year moving average detrending vs. Kuznets linear trends
between midpoints of five—year overlapping decadal averages, her use of a
two—stage approach to incorporate error terms in the pre—1918 fitted
values, and her use of 1909—28 instead of 1909—38 as the sample periodGNP Volatility, Page 10
for the regression.
In the bottom section of Figure 1 are listed the alternative series
that are used as explanatory variables in the Kuznets-Romer regression
estimates and in this paper. First is listed the basic Shaw commodity
output series, which was originally constructed by Shaw (1947) for 1869,
1879, and annually for 1889—1938, and which was extended by Kuznets to
provide annual estimates for 1869-1888. The Shaw series for total
commodity output and the various sectoral breakdowns, e.g., producers
durables and construction materials, is the basis for all the annual pre—
1909 real GNP estimates that have been made to date.
Next listed are the series that are used in this study for the first
time. Total railroad freight ton—miles are available annually on a
continuous basis from well before 1869 to the present. They should
provide a particularly homogenous measure of cyclical volatility until the
1920s, when trucking began partially to supplant railroad transportation.
Gradually from the 1920s until the present, the mix of transportation
services shifted, with railroads carrying a relatively larger share of crude
and intermediate materials, and trucks carrying an increasing share of
final goods. This means that, if crude and intermediate materials exhibit
greater volatility in production than final goods, a comparison of prewar
and postwar railroad traffic would understate the reduction in the
volatility of total real GNP.
Listed last in Figure 1 are the succession of construction activity
indexes used in this study. For the period since 1l5 an official U. S.
government index on real construction expenditures is available. TwoGNP Volatility, Page 11
sets of indexes of construction activity, differing mainly in their
increased coverage over time, were compiled by Moses Abrarnovitz (1964)
for the periods 1870—1897 and 1889—1918. Abramovitz' work is chosen
because it incorporates most prior research on construction activity.
Each set contains a nominal, deflated real, and physical volume index for
these two periods. The tables and text of this paper are limited to the
physical volume index, chosen because it exhibits substantially less
volatility during the 1870—1888 period. We also create our own measure
of construction activity in order to assess the effect of Abramovitz's
construction series on GNP volatility.
Volatility of Alternative Indexes
Historicalperspective onthe volatility of alternative indexes of real
GNP,and of other indexes listed in Figure 1,is provided by Table 1.
Here we list the standard deviations of deviations from trend, using the
seven—year moving average method of detrending. Our point of departure
is the radical reduction in volatility in moving from the Kuznets
components method to the Kuznets regression method, to Romer's
regression index, as exhibited by Romer (1985, Table 2). Her ratios of





Table 1 provides a more comprehensive view of the volatility of
alternativeindexes. The first six columns list standard deviations ofGNP Volatility, Page 12
deviations from trend for five alternative periods covering the interval
between 1872 and 1928, and for one postwar period, 1950—80. Column (7)
exhibits the ratio of the standard deviations for 1872—1928 to that for
1950—80.
Numerous alternative comparisons could be made between the eras
before and after World War II. Since no one disputes the higher
volatility of everything in the decade of the 1930s, none of the intervals
in Table 1 include that period. The postwar period is 1950—80, chosen to
be identical to Romer's comparison table, and includes the Korean War,
Vietnam War, and the period surrounding the first 1973—74 oil shock. Yet
in her comparisons Romer truncates the prewar interval at 1914, excluding
World War I and the 1920-21 depression.7 We believe that, even if the
1930s are excluded from the comparison, measures of the volatility of
prewar real GNP should cover the full 1872-1928 period. If only
peacetime periods were to be included, then a fair comparison for the
postwar would be the interval between 1954 and 1972, which excludes
both the Korean War and the first oil shock episode, although including
the effects of the Vietnam war. In fact, there is no systematic increase
in volatility caused by extending the termination date of the prewar
period from 1908 to 1928, as shown by the comparison of columns (4) and
(5) in Table 1.
7. Here Romer is inconsistent, since her regression equations
include the full 1909—28 period, including both World War I and the 1920-
21 depression. As we shall see, the L15—23 period is when the Kuznets
and Commerce indexes diverge substantially, accounting for the different
implications of our regressions compared to hers. In Table 8 below we
compare the alternative intervals 1872—1908 with 1954—72.GNP Volatility, Page 13
Several striking facts emerge from Table 1. First, inspecting the
ratios in column (7), one notes the same phenomenon stressed by Romer,
the decline in volatility in going from the components indexes in lines 1
and 2, to the Kuznets regression index on line 3, to the Romer regression
index on line 4. However, the ratio for the Romer index is 1.35, still
indicating that the prewar period was more volatile than the postwar,
albeit by a substantially narrower margin than in the conventional
Galiman/Commerce measures listed on line 1.
The volatility behavior of the sectoral output measures in lines 5—7
of Table 1 appears to have escaped previous notice in the literature.
There is virtually no difference in the prewar/postwar volatility ratio
between the Romer regression index, the Shaw commodity output index
spliced to GNP goods output, and the homogeneous railroad ton miles
index. All show a prewar volatility about one-third higher than postwar,
as contrasted with double the volatility exhibited by the Gailman and
Kuznets components indexes. Since all the components and regression
indexes are based on the lynchpin of the Shaw commodity output index,
one wonders why the relatively small decline in the volatility of
commodity output shown on line 5 has not received more notice, since
this comparison is of raw indexes and requires no econometric wizardry
to reveal.
In fact, if the Gailman and Kuznets indexes are blown up from
Shaw's commodity output index, using ratios that exhibit only trend and
not cyclical movements, one wonders how the difference between the
ratios in line 1 and line 5 could have emerged. The two leadingGNP Volatility, Page 14
hypotheses are that (1) the higher volatility of goods output than GNP in
the postwar supports the Romer hypothesis that line 1 overstates the
volatility of GNP relative to goods output in the prewar period or (2) an
increasing share of services and declining share of construction has
stabilized real GNP in the postwar period relative to the observed
volatility of commodity output.
Similarly, the homogenous railroad ton—miles figures have been lying
dormant in the Historical Statistics for years, and they reveal (on line 6)
roughly the same postwar decline in volatility as does the commodity
output comparison on line 5. Quite a different relationship between
prewar and postwar volatility is provided by the linked construction
indexes, as displayed on line 7. The ratio for 1872—1928/1950—80 is 2.06,
as high as for the Gailman components index, and is even higher for the
1872—1908 interval. Clearly construction must be the heart of any new
comparison of prewar and postwar GNP volatility, and indeed construction
is the centerpiece of our new research on regression-type real GNP
measures.
TheCase for Excess Volatility in Components Indexes
Kuznets believedthat the components index might be too volatile as
a measure of annual changes, and this motivated him to construct his
regression index.8 The essential issue is Kuznets' use in the
transportation, distribution, and construction sectors of ratios to
8. To repeat a statement quoted by Romer, Kuznets (1961, p. 546)
realized that "the series available as annual interpolators were frequently
the more sensitive indexes and .. . yieldannual values exaggerating the
short—term changes."GNP Volatility, Page 15
commodity output that. were allowed to move only with trend changes but
not on an annual basis. Hence the annual elasticity of deviations of
output from trend in the transportation, distribution, and construction
sectors to changes in the relevant component of commodity output was
assumed to be unity. But there are good theoretical and empirical
reasons to expect that the relevant elasticity would be less than unity.
Theoretical reasons include (1) the flexible accelerator hypothesis of
durable goods demand, which creates a relatively high cyclical elasticity
of durable goods output to total GNP, and thus a low elasticity of GNP
to the durable component of commodity output, and (2) the permanent
income hypothesis of consumption demand, which should dampen
fluctuations in the consumption of services relative to the output of
commodities, which includes not just consumer goods but also producers
durables and construction materials. Empirical reasons include the
relatively low observed elasticity of services output to commodities output
in the postwar NIPA data.9 Essentially the regression method is designed
to estimate the elasticity of non-commodity GNP to commodity GNP.
This motivates the subsequent attention to regression estimates as a
shortcut to provide estimates of missing data on non-commodity GNP
prior to 1919.
IlL Issues In Developing Regression Indexes
lusnetsvs. Cowwerce as Dependent Variable
9.Several regressions are reported by Romer and are not repeated
here. Below we compare our basic prewar regression estimates with
analogous regression estimates for the postwar period.GNP Volatility, Page 16
Since the basic motivation of this investigation, like that of Romer,
is to compare the volatility of prewar and postwar real GNP, a natural
presumption would be to use postwar measurement concepts wherever
possible. Since the Commerce Department has produced and continues to
publish its own index of real GNP beginning in 1909, defined to be
consistent with postwar concepts, an attempt to develop a comparable
real GNP series for the period before 1909 by the regression methodology
should use the Commerce real GNP series as a dependent variable in the
post—1908 period.'0 However, Romer chose instead to use the Kuznets
real GNP series for her regression estimates, and this makes a substantial
difference in the regression coefficients and their sensitivity to changing
sample periods and detrending methods.
The Commerce series and the Kuznets indexes used by Romer for
her regression estimates exhibit quite different deviations from trend over
the 1909—38 period. This contrast is displayed in Figure 2 using the
Romer seven—year moving average method, and in Figure 3 using the
benchmark method discussed in the next section. Both figures show
important differences in the Commerce series that are partly due to its
different treatment of government, and partly due to statistical revisions.
The main difference in behavior occurs during the 1909—23 subinterval.
Noticeable are different trends during 1909-13, quite different behavior
during World War I, especially in 1918, and a larger amplitude of the
1920-21 recession in the Commerce series than in Kuznets. The plots in
10. The Commerce real GNP index for 1909—28 is found in U. S.
Department of Commerce (1981, Table 1.22). This series is maintained in
the latest NIPA revision, U. S. Department of Commerce (1986).GNP Volatility, Page 17
Figures 2 and 3 reveal quite clearly that the Commerce and Kuznets
series differ in cyclical characteristics, denying Romer's undocumented
claim that "There is nothing in the (Commerce] corrections that
significantly changes the cyclical properties of the underlying Kuznets
components series. As a result, they can be ignored for the purpose of
deriving new GNP estimates that measure cycles more accurately" (Romer,
1985, p. 55). As we shall see, the low correlation between the Kuznets
and Commerce series in the 1909-18 decade accounts largely for the low
coefficients of real GNP on commodity output obtained in Romer's
regression equation for the 1909—28 sample period.
Prewar Okun's Law Equations
In examining Figures 2 and 3, one bizarre aspect of the Kuznets
series is its indication of a decline in detrended real GNP in 1918, the
peak year of World War I output. Evidence in support of the cyclical
properties of the Commerce index is provided by "Okun's Law" regressions
of two different measures of the unemployment rate on the Commerce and
Kuznets real GNP measures. The two measures are the Lebergott index
and the index that Romer (1986) has recently created and which has been
criticized by Weir (1985).
The regressions of the current unemployment rate on current and
lagged detrended real GNP are presented in Table 2. The first two
columns use Lebergott's unemployment series as the dependent variable,
and the second set of columns uses Romer's unemployment series.
Alternative explanatory variables are the Commerce and Kuznets real GNP
series. The standard error of estimate for both unemployment series isGNP Volatility, Page 18
lower when the Commerce series is used as an explanatory variable, and
the improvement in fit is quite substantial when the Lebergott
unemployment variable is used, as in column (1).
The Case for Detrending with Benchmarks
Detrending methods may make a difference in assessing the
historical volatility of any time series. If business cycles last longer than
seven years, then use of a seven—year moving average to detrend a series
may artificially dampen the cyclical variance of a series. The most
obvious case where this occurs is the Great Depression, when the
unemployment rate remained above the 1929 level for twelve straight
years.
In previous research we have developed a procedure for detrending
through selected benchmark years. For the postwar period, these years
are selected as those when the actual unemployment rate is close to a
series for the "natural" unemployment rate, which in turn is defined as
the rate which is consistent with steady inflation in the absence of
supply shocks.11 For the period between 1900 and 1949, the natural rate
is assumed constant for the portion of the labor force that excludes self—
employed farmers and proprietors, leading to a natural rate series that
rises slowly from 3.5 to 5.0 percent, reflecting the gradual decline in the
share of self—employment in the labor force. Benchmark years for this
period are also chosen as those which minimize the difference between
11. Separate sets of benchmarks are selected for annual and
quarterly data, using the same criterion of choosing those years or
quarters when the actual unemployment rate is close to the natural rate.
For details, see Gordon (1984, 1985).GNP Volatility, Page 19
this natural rate series and Lebergott's unemployment rate.
For the period between 1869 and 1890 we lack an unemployment rate
series to determine benchmarks. Because of doubts expressed in the
literature regarding the reliability of annual data between Census years
prior to 1890, we have simply taken each Census year in that period as a
benchmark. This leads to our final set of benchmark years, 1869, 1879,
1889, 1901, 1912, 1923, 1929, 1950, 1964, 1972, and 1979. In our previous
research on the postwar period 1954 and 1970 are also benchmark years,
but in this paper we did not want to smooth the postwar data by
choosing intervals between benchmark years substantially shorter than the
intervals chosen for the prewar years. Thus on average there are ten
years between benchmarks for both the prewar and postwar years in this
study.
Two problems are raised by the choice of benchmark years before
1900. First, the choice is arbitrary, since there is no comparable
unemployment series for use in selecting benchmark years. Second, while
the choice of 1889 creates no problems, since that year appears to be
"average" and quite similar for most indexes to surrounding years between
1888 and 1892, the choice of 1879 may have an impact on the results.
When 1879 is omitted as a benchmark year and a straight line is run
between 1869 and 1889, the detrended commodity output series and
Gailman's real GNP series seem remarkably high in 1880-82 (the Galiman
series is 19.2 percent above trend in 1880—2, comparable to the ratio of
NIPA real GNP to trend at the height of World War II in 1943—44, using
our benchmarks). In the opposite direction, several series on constructionGNP Vo]atility, Page 20
activity, examined below, display deviations from trend of —50 percent or
more between the mid 1870s and mid 1880s. Our results, by using 1879
as a benchmark year for detrending, tend to "flatten" these episodes of
volatility.
Figure 4 displays the Commerce series for 1909—38, detrended by the
two alternative methods, seven—year moving average and exponential
trends through benchmark years. The effect of the moving average
technique in smoothing out economic fluctuations is obvious. This brings
us back to the original issue that concerns Romer and ourselves, the
extent to which the postwar economy exhibits less cyclical volatility of
real GNP than the prewar economy. Surely those who have claimed that
the postwar economy was more stable than the prewar economy were
thinking of a year like 1936, with a (Lebergott) unemployment rate of 17
percent, as representing abnormal rather than normal conditions. Yet the
moving average detrending technique registers a deviation of Commerce
GNP from trend in 1936 as +6.6 percent, in contrast to the —21.7 percent
deviation indicated by the benchmarking technique. And, while the
Depression may represent an extreme case, the moving average technique
may prejudge the issue whether decade—long depressions occurred in the
1870s or 18908.12
12. Here are some examples of the zig—zags of the seven—year
moving average trend of real GNP, using the Gailman—Commerce series.
There is an average annual growth rate of the trend of +2.83 percent
during 1915—27, —2.02 percent during 1927—33, +6.28 percent during 1933—
45, —0.23 percent during 1945—49, +3.38 during 1949—75, and +2.33 during
1975—82. In contrast our benchmarking method yields more stable trends
of +2.33 percent during 1913—23, +3.41 percent during 1923—29, +2.50
percent during 1929—50, ÷3.53 percent during 1950—64, +3.48 percent during
1964—74, and +2.89 percent during 1974—84.GNP Volatility, Page 21
Table 3 displays standard deviations of deviations from trend for the
same series and time periods as Table 1, but now with the benchmark
technique of detrending rather than the seven—year moving average
technique. Standard deviations in Table 3 are uniformly higher than in
Table 1, as would be expected. However, the four alternative real GNP
series have quite similar ratios of prewar to postwar volatility in the two
tables. Benchmarking actually diminishes slightly the prewar/postwar
ratio of standard deviations for the two components series in lines 1 and
2. As is evident in the last three lines of the two tables, benchmarking
reduces slightly the prewar/postwar ratio of standard deviations for
commodity output, raises the ratio slightly for railroad ton miles, and
raises the ratio substantially for construction output.
Additional Explanatory Variables
Both the Kuznets and Romer regression indexes are based on
regression equations in which there is a single explanatory variable,
commodity output. This is consistent with the components indexes, which
estimate value added in various sectors by applying markups over
commodity output, with no other information used to estimate annual
values for the components in intracensus years beyond trends in
distributive margins and transportation costs.
However, it is worthwhile to ask whether there is informational
content in two data series on output outside of manufacturing, railroad
freight ton miles and construction output. The two advantages of the
railroad freight ton miles series are that it is homogerious for the entire
period since before 1870, and that it represents activity in a major sectorGNP Volatility, Page 22
outside of manufacturing.
There are also limitations to the usefulness of the railroad series.
The first limitation is the changing role of railroads in the transportation
sector, which railroads totally dominated before 1920. While the use of
autos for passenger transportation became important in the 1920s, it was
only in the postwar period that railroads received significant competition
from trucking for freight transportation. The second limitation is that
railroad freight ton miles do not measure real value added in railroad
freight transportation. There may be changes over the business cycle,
for instance, in the mix of traffic having high and low value-added per
ton. Third, even though railroads are part of the service sector, railroad
value added may not be a good indicator of the cyclical volatility of
value added in other services, since railroads carry cyclically sensitive
crude, intermediate, and final goods, while other services may consist of
less—cyclically—sensitive services in such establishments as barbershops and
food retailing. Our regression estimates will indicate whether railroad
freight ton miles improve the explanation of real GNP during the 1909—38
period, and whether the role of railroad freight ton miles is sensitive to
changes in the sample period, method of detrending, or the use of the
Kuznets vs. Commerce real GNP series as alternative dependent variables.
The use of direct indexes of construction output, in addition to
marked—up indexes of construction materials, has obvious appeal. In any
study of real GNP volatility, construction is critical, since it is much
more volatile that total GNP as a whole. Further, there are good reasons
to believe that the volatility of construction relative to the economy as aGNP Volatility, Page 23
whole was greater in the prewar period than postwar. Our own
interpretation of the Great Depression places heavy weight on the
unsustainably high level of construction activity during 1924—27 as a
source of the severity and duration of the construction slump of the
193Os.'
If construction was more volatile in the prewar period, then there is
a further reason to pay careful attention to measuring this volatility.
Construction represented a more important part of the economy in the
late nineteenth century than in the postwar period, and so the sensitivity
of GNP estimates to alternative methods of estimating construction output
should be greater than would be the case for the postwar. It is useful to
review the time series on the share of construction output in GNP,
measured in constant prices:'4
1869—781899—1908 1929 1950 1960 1974 1979
Share 15.2 12.0 11.4 10.4 10.0 8.4 8.2
(percent)
Our measure of construction activity after 1914 is the official BLS—
Commerceseries for real construction expenditures, linked beginning in 1929to
theoutput of structures in the NIPA. For 1914 and earlier years, the basic
13. See Gordon and Wilcox (1981) and Gordon and Veitch (1986).
14. The first two columns are measured in 1860 prices, from
Gallman (1966), Table 3 on p. 11 and Table 4 on p. 15. The other
columns are measured in 1929 prices, from the Economic Repc￿rt
President, February 1986, Table B-6 and B-7. No adjustment is made for
the difference between the share of construction in 1860 and 1929 prices,
pending the location of appropriate deflators.GNP Volatility, Page 24
measure used as an explanatory variable in the real GNP regressions, and to
backcast real GNP for 1869—1908, is the Abramovitz (1964) series on the physical
volume of construction. Abramovitz constructed three aggregate indexes for the
period from 1870 to 1918 on the basis of existing series measuring construction
activity, including (1) an index of value in current prices, (2) an index of value
in constant prices, and (3) an index of volume in physical units. Each of these
indexes covers a combination of urban residential, urban nonresidential excluding
government, and railroad and public utilities construction; these categories
accounted for 75 to 80 percent of total construction in the period covered.
We use Abramovitz' construction series because they incorporate the
relevant previous research. Among the sources used for the nominal and real
value indexes are Riggleman's index of the value of building permits, as adjusted
by Isard, Ulmer's series on gross capital expenditures of railroads, Blank's- series
on expenditures for new private nonfarm dwelling units, and Long's index of the
value of nonresidential building. Used for the physical volume index are Long's
index of the number of residential and nonresidential buildings, an index of rail
consumption by weight, and Blank's index of new private nonfarm housing starts.
Our choice of the physical volume index, rather than the deflated value
index, reflects the lower volatility of the latter in the period between 1870 and
1890. We did not want our results to be heavily dependent on the greater
volatility of the deflated value index, which shows a greater amplitude of the
construction depression of the 1870s than does the physical volume index. The
following illustrates the enormous twenty—year slumr in construction that is
indicated by both indexes:GNP Volatility,Page 25
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Themagnitude of the construction depression is obviously disguised by the
seven—year moving average method of detrending, but it appears that our choice
of 1879 as a benchmark year also implies that our benchmarking method of
detrending minimizes the magnitude of the construction cycle. For this reason
our regression index is likely to understate the volatility of GNP before 1890.
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS
QenerelDescription of Regression Results
The regressions of real GNP on one or more indexes of economic activity
arereported in Tables 4 and 5.All regressions in Table 4 use the Kuznets index
of real GNP as dependent variable and all in Table 5 use the Commerce measure
as dependent variable. Otherwise each table is arranged in the same way, with
the top half displaying results that use the seven-year moving average method of
detrending (hereafter 7MA), and bottom half displaying results using the trend—
through-benchmark—years method of detrending (hereafter TTB). In the left six
columns the sample period is 1909—28 and in the right six columns is 1909—38.GNP Volatility, Page 26
Each group of six columns contains six alternative arrangements of the
explanatory variables, with commodity output alone in column (1), commodity and
railroad in column (2), commodity and construction in column (3), railroad and
construction in column (4), all three in column (5), and all three plus the lagged
dependent variable in column (6). We note first in Table 4 that in column (1)
the coefficient on commodity output alone ranges from 0.61 to 1.00, and that
either exclusion of 1929—38 or the use of 7MA contributes to a lower coefficient.
Clearly, the lower the coefficient, the lower the estimated volatility of real GNP
prior to 1909, when these regression equations are used for statistical
backcasting. Romer's choice of the 1909—28 sample period and the use of 7MAis
responsible for her relatively low coefficient of 0.61, and thus contributes to her
conclusion that the prewar volatility of real GNP is a statistical illusion.
Table 4 also indicates that the statistical significance of the railroad and
construction indexes interacts with the choice of sample period and detrending
method. With 7MA,neitherthe railroad or construction index is significant,
except when commodity output is excluded. However, with TTB, the addition of
these two indexes improves the fit markedly. The coefficient on each of the
two indexes is twice or more its standard error in column (5), and the standard
error of estimate in column (5) compared to column (1) declines by 15 percent
for the 1909—28 sample period and 18 percent for the 1909—38 sample period. In
all these results we note the role of the Great Depression in raising the
coefficient on commodity output as compared to the 1909—28 period, whether or
not the railroad and construction indexes are included, thus confirming Weir's
(1985) point that Rorner's conclusion .f low volatility is heavily dependent on
excluding the Great Depression from her regressions.GNP Volatility, Page 27
Effect of Using the Commerce Real GNP Series
Table 5 differs only in using the Commerce rather than Kuznets real GNP
series as dependent variable. There are two consistent features of Table 5 as
contrasted with Table 4.First, the exclusion of the Great Depression no longer
makes an important difference. If anything, the regression coefficients are
higher when the Depression is excluded than when it is included, reversing the
relationship shown in Table 4. This suggests to us that the real reason for the
relatively low coefficients on commodity output in column 1 for the 1909—28
period in Table 4 is an inaccurate cyclical pattern in the Kuznets real GNP
series, as contrasted with the Commerce series, prior to 1929.
The second difference in Table 5 is in the coefficients. When commodity
output alone is included, the coefficients in Table 5 are higher for the 1909—28
period but not appreciable different for 1909-38. Once the railroad and
construction indexes are added, however, the coefficients on commodity output
are uniformly and significantly lower in Table 5 than in Table 4. Corresponding
to this fact is the higher and more uniform statistical significance of the
railroad and construction indexes in Table 5, excepting only construction when
detrended by the 7MA method.
RegressionEstimates for the Postwar Period
In Table 6 are displayed regression estimatesfor the postwar period. The
formatof the table is the same as Tables 4 and 5. Since the dependent variable
istheCommerce (NIPA) real GNP series, the relevant comparison of prewar and
postwarbehavior is between Tables 5 and 6. The first difference evident in
Table 6 8thatrailroad ton miles are never significant, perhaps not surprisinglyGNP Volatility, Page 28
in light of the much reduced share of railroads in the transportation sector.
Second, while construction is always significant with the 7MA detrending method,
it is not significant with the benchmark method except when the lagged
dependent variable is included, as in column (6). The significance of the lagged
dependent variable, particularly with the TTB method, may reflect the persistence
of postwar business cycles, and/or the growing importance of the unmeasured
service industry sector.
An interesting comparison can be made between sums of coefficients in
column (5) for the prewar and postwar periods, using the two detrending
methods:
Sum of Coefficients on Explanatory Variables
in Column 5
09—28 7r1A 09—38 7MA 54—82 7MA 09—28 TTB 09—38 TTB 54—85 TTB
Sum 0.81 0.69 0.65 0.73 0.60 0.73
These results are starkly at variance with Romer's findings. First, aswenoted
beforethere is no systematic tendency for the prewar coefficients to be lower
when the Depression years are excluded. Second, the postwar sum of
coefficients is not markedly lower than 1909—38 with the 7MA method and is
higher than 1909-38 with the TTB method.
Creationof a Regression Estimate of Real QNP, 1869-1908
Wefollow Romer in using a two—stage procedure to estimate real GNP
before 1909. The differences are our use of the Commerce rather than Kuznets
real GNP series as dependent variable, the choice of multiple explanatory
variables, the method of detrending, and the sample period of the regression.GNP Volatility, Page 29
We begin by positing a "true" relationship between real GNP and a set of
extrapolators, with all variables expressed as deviations from their
respective trends:
GNPco +acCO+cRT+)'ST+ec, (1)
where GNP is the Commerce estimate of real GNP, CO is Shaw's commodity output
series, RT is railroad ton-miles, and ST is the Abramovitz construction
series, spliced to the BLS—Commerce series in 1915. By running a regression




where the standard errors of the parameter estimates are in parentheses below
each estimate.The coefficients in (2) are from Table 5, column (5), in the
lower right-hand quadrant (1909-38 sample period, TTB detrending method).
Notice that (2) will understate the true variance of GNP, since its true
variance is:
Var(GNPc) Var(cCO +cRT+VST)+Var(ec). (3)
Using OLS to extrapolate data using (2) understates the true variance of real
GNP, which includes not only the first variance term in (3) coming from the
extrapolation, but also the second variance term.
To correct this bias, an estimate of the error term ec is needed. We
follow the same two—stage procedure as Romer. The first stage involves
regressing another estimate of GNP, in this case the Kuznets series (GNPk), onGNP Volatility, Page 30
the same set of extrapolators as above. A regression is run over the period
1909—38 to obtain:
GNPk ao +aiC0+kRT+VkST+ei (4)
=—0.68 +0.81 Co —0.06RT +0.09ST
(0.58) (0.10)(0.05)(0.02)
Taking the residual from (1), c, and regressing it against the residual of
(4), ê, we obtain the relation
ecek+u. (5)
The estimated relationship between the error terms c and kis:
êc= 0.l8êk. (6)
(0.25)
A second regression using GNPk is run over the period 1870—1908 to obtain ek.
Theregression results for the period 1870—1908 are:
GNPk=—O.15+0.92C0—O.0711T+0.O7ST (7)
(0.33) (0.05)(0.04) (0.02)
The residuals of (7) provide our estimates of the error term k,whichare
used together with the coefficients in (2) and (6) to calculate the backcasted
real GNP series for 1870—1908:
GNPo +acCO+cRT+VST+êi (8)
—1.80 +0.32CO +0.15RT +0.14ST +0.188k.
Evenwith the error correction, the variance of (8) will understate the
true variance of real GNP, since from equation (5) Var(êc) > 2Var(êk).GNP Volatifity, Page 31
Furthermore, since the estimates of c are low and insignificant, we are likely
missing much of the effect of ec on the estimates of GNPc. Therefore,
estimates of variance using the extrapolation technique outlined above must be
considered as providing a lower bound of the variance of real GNP, rather than
an exact measure of variance.'5
The Volatilityof Alternative Regression Indexes
Asindicated in Part III, there are several differences between our
regression indexes of real GNP and those of Kuznets and Romer. These are the
distinction between the Kuzneta and Commerce dependent variable, between a
single explanatory variable and multiple explanatory variables, between sample
periods ending in 1928 and 1938, and between alternative methods of
detrending. Using the method described above in Part IV, alternative
regression indexes of real GNP for the years 1869—1908 have been constructed,
and their standard deviations of deviations from trend are summarized in Table
15. We may be able to obtain an idea of the size of Var(ec) by looking
at the standard deviation of the regression residuals. For equation (2),
Var(êc)(3.02)2. It would be unreasonable to apply this standard deviation
to the period 1870—1908, but we can obtain an estimate for this period by
comparing Var(êk) to Var (sc) and apply this relationship to the Var(êk)
during the period 1870—1908. For the period 1909—38, Var(êc)/Var(êk)
(3.02/2.22)21.85. Thus, an estimate Var(ec) for the period 1870—1908 would
be Var(êc)1.85 Var(êk)lelo-lao.1.85 (1.77)25.80. Thus, we can obtain
an estimate of the variance of GNP over the period 1870—1908 from (3) as:
Var(GNPc) Var(cccCO + cRT + )'cST) + Var(êc)
21.27 + 5.80 27.07
Thus, the standard deviation of deviations from trend over the period 1872-
1908 would be 5.20 with this estimate of STD(c) included, as contrasted with
4.19 that was obtained using the two stage regression method. The drawback of
this method is that it provides no information about ec in each individual
year, only about Var(ec) over the entire sample period. This is an important
drawback when trying to form annual estimates of real GNP.GNP Volatility, Page 32
7.
An examination of the first four lines of Table 7 indicates that the addition
of the railroad and construction series make8 no difference when the Kuznets
real GNP series is used as dependent variable. Instead, what matters is the
choice between 1928 and 1938 as the termination date of the sample period. But,
as we have seen in Tables 4 and 5, the importance of the sample period is
heavily dependent on the use of the Kuznets dependent variable. When the
Commerce dependent variable is used, the 1928 vs. 1938 issue is reversed in its
implications, since coefficients are higher, not lower, when 1928 is the
termination date.
The comparison of lines 5 and 6 indicates that the choice of the TTB
method of detrending raises the estimated variance of pre-1909 GNP but slightly
reduces the ratio of the variance of prewar to postwar GNP. As we shall see in
subsequent sections of Table 7, the TTB method seems to raise the variance of
postwar GNP relatively more than that of prewar GNP, so that the hypothesis
that the variance of real GNP (relative to trend) has declined in the postwar
period is (ironically) more strongly supported by the 7MA method chosen by
Romer than by the TTB method that we prefer.
Lines 7 and 8 of Table 7 constitute the basic results of this paper, prior to
the "fine tuning" that is reported below. We note that with the 7MA method of
detrending, a regression estimate that uses the Commerce dependent variable, all
three explanatory variables, and the 1909-38 sample period, the volatility index
displayed in line 7, column (4), is almost as high as for the basic Gailman series
in Table 1, line 1, column (7). Comparing lines 7 and 8 of Table 7, we observe
also that the TTB method of detrending raises the variance of the postwarGNP Volatility, Page 33
official NIPA series more than that of the estimated prewar series, implying a
reduction in the prewar/postwar variance ratio when the TTB method is used.'6
Sensitivityof RealGNP Estiwates to Alternative Construction Series
The regression indexes that are based on three explanatory variables,
commodity output, railroad ton—miles, and construction output, are subject to the
possible criticism that there is a break in coverage and method between the
Abramovitz construction index and the subsequent post—1914 BLS—Commerce index
of construction activity. It is evident from Table 7 that our finding of higher
prewar volatility than Romer does not hinge on our treatment of construction,
since a comparison of lines 5 and 7 for the 7MA method of detrending shows no
change in volatility when just commodity output or three explanatory variables
are used, and a comparison of lines 6 and 8 shows that volatility decreases
markedly with the addition of the railroad and construction variables. As
indicated by Figure 5, this occurs because in some periods within the 1869—1908
interval, either railroad ton—miles or construction or both have deviations from
trend going in the opposite direction from commodity output, and this tends to
dampen the volatility of the real GNP regression series that results from using
commodity output as the only explanatory variable.
The source of the volatility in the Abramovitz physical volume series is
evident from just a cursory glance at Figure 6. The components on which the
Abramovitz series is based, indexes of nonresidential and residential building
16. A plot of the official NIPA real GNP series detrended with the 7MA
and TTB method over the 1954-72 period indicates that the long boom of the
1960s is much more prominent with TTB detrending, and this helps to explain the
much higher postwar standard deviation of the NIPA real GNP series when TTP
detrending is used as contrasted with 7MA detrending.GNP Volatility, Page 34
permits and rail consumption, show much more cyclical variability than does the
construction materials series on which the Kuznets construction index is based.
The collapse of construction implied by the building permit series in the 1870's
is striking; the building permits index falls nearly 75 percent from a peak in
1871 to the trough in 1880. Yet, because of the nature of the building permit
series, it may not be as accurate an indication of actual construction activity as
we would like. The building permit series, constructed by Clarence Long, is
based on a gradually increasing coverage of one to twenty—nine cities——one
(Philadelphia) in 1856, three (Philadelphia, Manhattan, and the Bronx) in 1863,
and finally up to twenty—nine cities in 1912. This incomplete and limited
coverage may not provide an accurate picture of construction activity in the late
nineteenth century, since construction activity in fast growing cities in the
midwest and west are likely to be excluded from the sample. Furthermore,
building permits may not be as good an indicator of building activity as they are
today for the simple reason that a building permit may not have been required
for all types of construction. Also, new building permits neglect maintenance
and rehabilitation, components of spending that may be less cyclical than new
construction.
However, the construction materials series is not above suspicion. The
period 1869-1889 looks implausibly smooth when compared to the same series
over the period 1889—1914. The post—1889 series is Shaw's Output of
Construction Materials and represents data on construction materials such as
lumber, crossties, sand and gravel, crushed stone, cement, brick, rails, structural
ironwork, etc. The pre—1889 series is Kuznets' extrapolation of Shaw's series.
Kuzriets takes Shaw's output of construction materials in the census years 1869,GNP Volatility, Page 35
1879, and 1889 and interpolates between these years using data on the production
of nails and rails and of lumber for 1869-79 and adding cement and roofing slate
in the period 1879—89. This short list of materials seems to be a slim reed on
which to establish a measure of the volatility of construction output.
Reconciling some of the conflicting evidence on construction may be an
important step in addressing the prewar/postwar volatility issue.
Given the conflicting evidence on construction, we construct our own
construction series that is more homogeneous than either the construction
materials—based series or the Abramovitz series and incorporates information
contained in each of the series. By running a regression of the BLS—Commerce
construction series (CST) for 1915—1936 on the output of construction materials
(CM), total residential and nonresidential building permits (BP), and rail
consumption (RC), we can obtain coefficients for use in "backcasting"
construction output for the 1869-1914 period:
CST =4.88+0.65CM+0.32BP+0.O4RC,SEE =11.87,R2 =0.93
(0.35) (0.11)(0.17) D.W. =1.25
Becausemost ofthe weight is placed on the less volatile construction materials,
theresulting backcasted construction isless volatile than the construction series
basedon Abramovitz (see Figure 7).
When the new construction output series is used in place of the Abramovitz
index of real GNP for 1869—1908, we obtain the volatility measures listed on lines
9 and 10 of Table 7. With the 7MA method of detrending the prewar/postwar
ration of standard deviations falls from 1.96 with Abramovitz to 1.83 with the
backcasted construction series, and with the TTB detrending method the ratio
declines from 1.56 to 1.43. However, these volatility measures doubtless are
understatements, since no error term has been added to the backcastedGNP Volatility, Page 36
construction series.
Figure 8 shows our two estimates of GNP and the Galiman series. Two
observations are readily apparent from the figure. The first is how similar our
two series are over most of the sample, and the second is how different our two
estimates are from the Gailman series in the 1880s. Either the Gailman series
overestimates the boom in the 1880s, or, our estimates underestimate the boom.
Because of the opposing direction railroad ton—miles and construction are taking
relative to commodity output, the series tend to cancel each other out in the
1880s. We believe that our series may well be superior to Gallman's for the
period of the 1870s and 1880s, because Galiman's estimates are entirely based on
the assumption that noncommodity output mimicks the behavior of commodity
output, whereas our series introduce the railroad traffic and construction activity
series as additional information on noncommodity output.
Has the Volatility of real GNP been understated?
Ourestimates of GNP inTable 7 are by no means the most volatile
that one could develop with the regression technique. We believe that there are
at least four reasons to believe that all the estimates shown in Table 7
understate the prewar/postwar volatility ratio.
1. Postwar wars and shocks. In comparing 1872-1928 with 1950-1980, we
are including World War T in the first period and Korea, Vietnam, and the oil
shocks in the second period. A better comparison of peacetime no—shock
intervals would be 1872—1908 with 1954—72. As we shall see in Table 8, such a
comparison raises prewar/postwar ratios relative to those shown in Table 7.
4. The Dejession Issue. Romer has argued that the Great Depression is
atypical, and that regression estimates should be based on the shorter 1909—28GNP Volatility, Page 37
sample period. However, as we learn in Table 8, with the Commerce real GNP
series as dependent variable, choice of the shorter sample period raises the
volatility estimates above those shown in Table 7.
3.The 1879 Issue. The relatively low volatility ratios that occur with the
TTB method of detrending may be sensitive to the choice of 1879 as a
benchmark year, because this choice tends to flatten out the long two—decade
slump in construction activity during the 1879s and 1880s.
4. Low Residual Error in Regression Index. The two-stage method of
backward extrapolation is likely to understate the volatility of the resulting
regression index, simply because the coefficient applied to the constructed error
term (ek) is so low. The argument given above in footnote 15 suggests that an
extra 20 percent might be added to our prewar/postwar volatility ratios on this
account. In the same category is the fact that our backcasted construction
index is extrapolated with no error term at all.
By making some quite "reasonab1e' changes in our procedure to account for
some of the issues listed above, we can produce estimates of GNP that are close
to the volatility ratio of the original Gailman series. Table 8 displays some
alternative estimates of volatility for the no—shock peacetime comparison of
1872—1908 with 1954—72. All comparisons in Table 8 are based on use of the
Abrarnovitz construction series rather than the backcasted construction series, on
the ground that no error term has been added to the latter and therefore that
its volatility is understated.
Table 8, line 1 displays the same index as Table 7, line 8. Use of the
alternative comparison interval raises the volatility ratio by. 11 percent, from
1.56 to 1.73. If we had forgotten to include railroad ton—miles, we would haveGNP Volatility, Page 38
achieved an increase in volatility of another 9 percent, from 1.73 to 1.88. If the
sample period were stopped in 1928 instead of 1938, as recommended by Romer,
the volatility ratio would have increased by another 14 percent to 2.15 (with
railroads) and by 15 percent to 2.17 without railroads. This brings us to a
volatility ratio 95 percent as large as Gailman's 2.30 (shown on line 5).
Table 8 deals oniy with points 1 and 2 on the above list of four factors
that may cause the volatility ratios to be understated in Table 7. Point 3,
regarding 1879, is not taken into account in Table 8. When 1879 is excluded as
a benchmark year, and a trend line is drawn straight from 1869 to 1879, there is
an enormous increase in the volatility of all the indexes developed in previous
research. For Gailman the prewar/postwar ratio, using 1872—1908 versus 1954—72
as in Table 8, rises from 2.30 to 2.93, for Kuznets regression from 1.94 to 3.11,
and for Romer regression from 1.59 to 2.41. This occurs because the growth of
the trend line between 1869 and 1879 is much faster (5.1 percent per annum for
Galirnan) than between 1879 and 1889 (3.1 percent). Imposition of a trend line
growing at a steady 4.1 percent between 1869 and 1889 leads to an enormous
positive bulge of the Gailman, Kuznets, and Romer indexes above trend in the
period 1879—1884. For instance, the Gailman series is a full 21 percent above
trend in 1882, as far above trend as was the U. S. economy in 1944 at the peak
of World War II war production. With 1879 used as a benchmark, 1882 for the
Galiman series is "only" 11 percent above trend, as shown in Figure 8.
We view the behavior of the detrended series without the 1879 benchmark
as implausible and thus do not display in Table 8 the alternative measures based
on dropping the 1879 benchmark. Instead, we pfefer the interpretation that
commodity output in the 1869 census may have been understated, implying thatGNP Volatility, Page 39
the 'true" trend growth rate between 1869 and 1879 was not 5.1 percent, but
perhaps closer to the 4.1 percent observed from 1889 to 1899. By choosing
census years as benchmarks, we prevent the uncertainty about the accuracy of
the decennial censusses from influencing our measures of volatility based on
deviations from trend lines drawn between benchmark years.
Finally, the last of our four points about volatility suggests that all the
estimates in the top part of Table 8 may be understated, perhaps by 20 percent.
The argument stated in footnote 15 implies that, instead of ranging from 1.73 to
2.17 in Table 8, adjusted prewar/postwar volatility ratios may range from 2.08 to
2.60. This would boost the upper end of our range of estimates above that of
the Gailman series.
V. Conclusion
We have examined the sensitivity of regression indexes of real GNP for the
1869—1908 period to alternative dependent variables, sample periods, detrending
methods, and inclusion of additional explanatory variables. Starting from the
Galiman components series, which exhibits a standard deviation of deviations
from trend that is 2.3 times as high during 1872—1908 as during 1954-72, we have
shown that it is possible to construct a wide variety of regression indexes, all
having prewar/postwar volatility ratios in the range of 1.73 to 2.17. The shift
from the Kuznets to the Commerce real GNP series as dependent variable raises
the volatility ratio and also indicates that inclusion of the Great Depression in
the sample period of the regression reduces rather than raises the volatility
ratio. The addition of railroad ton—miles and a measure of construction activity
as explanatory variables tends to reduce the volatility ratio, mainly becauseGNP Volatility, Page 40
railroad output and construction tend to offset the large boom of the early
1880s. Finally, the trends-through—benchmarks method of detrending tends to
reduce the prewar/postwar volatility ratio relative to the seven—year moving
average method, mainly because the TTB method raises postwar volatility more
than prewar volatility.
Thus, we find that there is no case at all that the standard view of higher
prewar volatility of real GNP is "spurious." By altering the specification
dimensions of the regression technique, including extrapolators, sample periods,
dependent GNP series, and detrending methods, we can create a wide range of
regression estimates of real GNP during the 1869—1908 period. Depending on the
precise combination used, we can obtain estimates of the volatility of prewar
real GNP that range from 50 to more than 100 percent higher than the volatility
of postwar GNP. However, we do not fully endorse the standard Gailman series,
particularly for the 1880s. We show that the use of additional information on
noncommodity output (railroad traffic and construction activity) implies that the
economy was much less robust in the 1879-1885 period than is suggested by the
Gailman series.
This paper does not endorse a single series as the "correct" measure of
real GNP for the 1869—1908 period. Instead, it emphasizes the uncertainty
implied by the sensitivity of the regression method to minor changes of
specification and sample period. By setting out a wide range of estimates, we
hope to stimulate discussion and the search for additional data series that may
in future research make it possible to narrow the range of estimates of pre—1909
real GNP.GNP Volatility, Page 4O.
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Description of Data Series
GNP
(i) GNPc -Gailman/CommerceSeries
1869—1908: Net National Product from Milton Friedman and Anna J.
Schwartz, Monetary Trends in the United States and the United
Kingdom. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1982, (based
on Galiman) plus Capital Consumption from Simon Kuznets,
Capital in the American Economy, Princeton: NBER, 1961.
1909—1928: National Income and Product Accounts, 1929—1976, Table
1.22.
1929—1985: NIPA, Table 1.2.
(ii)GNPi -Gallman/Kuznets'Components Series
1869-1888: Net National Product (Gallman) plus Capital Consumption
(Kuznets).
1889—1918: Real GNP Variant 3, Kuznets' Components, from Capital in
the American Economy, Table R 26, unravelled five year moving
average.
1919—1949: Real GNP Variant 3, Kuznets, from Capital in the
American Economy, Table R 2.
(iii) GNPkr —Kuznets'Regression Series
1869—1888: Replication of Kuznets' unpublished regression series.
1889—1918: Real GNP Variant 3, Kuznets' Regression Series, from
Capital in the American Economy, Table R 22.
1919—1949: Kuznets Variant 3 (the same as the components series overGNP Volatility, Page 44
this time period).
(iv)GNPr -Romer/Kuznets
1872—1918: Romer's Real GNP series.
1919—1949: Kuznets' Variant 3 series.
Extrapolator s
(i)Commodity Output
1869—1928: Total commodity output, Shaw's Series, from Capital in the
American Economy, Table R 21.
1929—1985: Production of Goods —NIPATable 1.4.
(ii)Railroad Ton Miles
1870—1889: Burns, Arthur, Production Trends in the United States
Since 1870, Princeton: NBER, 1934.
1890—1957: Historical Statistics—Colonial Times to Present.
1958—1983: Statistical Abstract of the United States, various issues.
1984: Transportation in America, November 1984 supplement.
1985: Personal correspondence with Association of American Railroads.
(iii) Construction (C70)
1869-1888: Index of Urban Building and Public Utility Construction, —
PhysicalVolume, series dO, segment 1, from Source Book of
Statistics Relating to Construction. eds Robert E. Lipsey and
Doris Preston, New York: NBER, 1966.
1889-1914: Index of Urban Building and Public Utility Construction -
PhysicalVolume, series C70, segment II.
1915—1928: Total New Construction, series 022, Lipsey and Preston.
1929—1985: Production of Structures. NIPA, Table 1.4.GNP Volatility, Page 45
(iv)Construction (C69)
1870—1888:Index of Urban Building and Public Utility Construction —
ConstantDollars, series C69 segment I, from Source Book of
Statistics Relating to Construction. eds Robert E. Lipsey and
Doris Preston, New York: NBER, 1966.
1889—1914: Index of Urban Building and Public Utility Construction —
ConstantDollars, series C69, segment II.
1915—1928: Total New Construction, series C22, Lipsey and Preston.
1929—1985: Production of Structures. NIPA, Table 1.4.
Other Variables
(i)Capital Consumption
1869-1918: Unravelled five year moving average from Capital in the
American Economy. Table R 29.
1919—1929: Capital in the American Economy. Table R 8.
(ii)Construction Materials
1869—1888: Unravelled five year moving average of Kuznets' Gross
Total Construction, constant dollars, from Capital in the
American Economy. Table R 29. Linked in 1888 to:
1889—1939: Output of Construction Materials Destined for Domestic
Consumption, 1913 Dollars, from William H. Shaw, Value of
Commodity Output Since 1869.
(iii) Building Permits, Total New Buildings
1869—1936: Index of Number, Total New Buildings, originally compiled
by Clarence D. Long. Series B5 in Lipsey and Preston.GNP Volatility, Page 46
(iv)Rail Consumption
1869—1950: Rail Consumption (Tonnage). Series D 16 in Lipsey and
Preston.
(v)Unemployment Lebergott
1890—1930: Lebergott's unemployment series, Christina Romer,
"Spurious Volatility in Historical Unemployment Data," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 94, Number 1, February 1986, pp. 1-37.
1931—1941: Series E2, BLS, from Long Term Economic Growth, 1860—
1970.
(vi)Unemployment Romer
1890—1930: Romer's unemployment series, Romer.
1931—1941: Series B2, ELS, from Long Term Economic Growth, 1860-
1970.Table 1
Standard Deviations of Deviations from Trend
of Alternative Series, 1872—1980,
Detrended with Seven—year Moving Averages
Ratio















Alternative Real GAfF Series
1. Galiman (1869—1908)/
Conunerce (1909—80) 3.94 4.49 5.22 4.20 4.54 2.10 2.16
2. Galinian (1869—88)/
Kuznets Conip (1889—1918)1
Kuznets Inc 1919—38) 3.98 5.07 3.82 4.55 4.28 2.04a
3. Kuznets Regression
(1869—1918)/Kuznets
Income (1919—38) 3.33 3.64 3.27 3.46 3.37 l.60a
4. Homer Regression
(1869—1918)/Kuznets
Income (1919—38) 2.96 2.69 3.09 2.73 2.83 1.35a




GNP (1939—80) 3.714.573.87 4.124.00 2.92 1.37
6.Railroad Ton Miles




Structures GNP (1929—80)13.2812.148.46 12.5211.24 5.45 2.06
Note:a. Listed Series for 1872—1928 compared with Commerce Real GNP, 1950—80.Table 2
Regressions of Alternative Unemployment Series




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 3.47 4.19 4.16 4.74
(0.38) (0.51) (0.39) (0.38)
Commerce, GNP -0.46 —0.38
Current Year (0.02 (0.04)
Commerce GNP, -0.02 —0.07
lagged one year (0.04) (0.04)
Kuznets GNP, —0.42 —0.37
Current Year (0.06) (0.04)
Kuznets GNP, -0.03 -0.06
lagged one year (0.06) (0.05)
SEE 1.61 2.29 1.67 1.70
R2 0.95 0.90 0.94 0.90
D.W. 0.46 0.99 0.60 0.82Table 3
Standard Deviations of Deviations from Trend
of Alternative Series, 1872—1980,
LinearTrends through Benchmark Years
Ratio















Alternative Real GNP Series
1.Gailman (1869—1908)/
Commerce(1909—80) 6.41 5.545.96 6.276.26 3.28 1.91
2. Gailman (1869—88)/
Kuznets Conip (1889—1918)! -
KuznetsInc (1919—38) 6.41 5.97 4.73 6.476.11 1.86a
3. Kuznets Regression
(1869—1918) /Kuznets
Income (1919—38) 5.45 4.70 4.13 5.30 5.00 1.52a
4. Homer Regression
(1869—1918)/Kuznets
Income (1919—38) 4.373.933.97 4.354.40 1.34a




GNP(1939—80) 6.15 5.40 4.13 6.09 5.64 4.44 1.27
6. RailroadTon Miles




StructuresGM' (1929—80) 14.4317.7317.75 16.4116.75 5.22 3.21




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Volatility of Alternative Regression
Estimates of Real GNP, Prewar Compared to Poatwa;
Alternative Detrending Methods
Dependent ExplanatorySampleDetrendirig 1872— 1872— 1950— Ratio








1. Kuznets Commodities 1909—28 7MA 2.60 2.81 2.10 1.34
Only
2. Kuznets All Threea 1909—28 7MA 2.59 2.83 2.10 1.35
3. Kuznets Commodities 1909—38 7MA 3.69 3.52 2.10 1.68
Only
4. Kuznets All Threea 1909—38 7MA 3.65 3.49 2.10 1.66
5. CommerceCommodities 1909—38 7MA 3.51 4.11 2.10 1.96
Only
6. CommerceCommodities 1909—38 TTB 6.02 6.06 3.28 1.85
7. CommerceAll Threea 1909—38 7MA 3.42 4.11 2.10 1.96
8. CommerceAll Thre& 1909—38 TTB 4.70 5.13 3.28 1.56
9. CommerceAll Threeb 1909—38 7MA 2.90 3.90 2.10 1.83
10. CommerceAll Threeb 1909—38 TTB 3.75 4.69 3.28 1.43
Notes:a. Three included indexes are Shaw's commodity output series, railroad ton-miles,
andthe Abramovitz construction series.
b. Threc included indexes are Shaw's commodity output series, railroad ton—miles,
and the backcasted construction series based on three construction ixdexes.Table 8
Factors That Increase the Pre—war/Post—war
Volatility Ratio, Estimates Based on
Benchmark Method of Detrending
Standard Deviations
Railroads Sample 1872—1954-Ratio
Index Included? Period 1908 1972 (1)/(2)
(1) (2) (3)
This Study, Coerce










Yes 1909—38 4.71 2.73 1.73
No 1909—38 5.14 2.73 1.88
Yes 1909—28 5.87 2.73 2.15
No 1909—28 5.93 2.73 2.17
——— 6.27 2.73 2.30
No 1909—38 5.30 2.73 1.94
No 1909—28 4.35 2.73 1.59R
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